By definition, groupthink is the corrosion of mental efficiency, reality testing as well as moral judgment which increases the probability of a group reach a potentially defective decision. Groupthink influenced the US invasion of Afghanistan decision-making process in at least two ways. First, it played the role of tainting the entire decision-making process by encouraging conformity while diminishing serious assessment of the policy. Second, groupthink was responsible for inaccurate and incomplete evaluations of the consequences of the Afghan War to the US which informed the policy (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). In the wake of 9/11, members of the core group to the Afghanistan decision-making process came under immense pressure to produce an effective policy, and groupthink was courted by stress, intergroup conflict and promotional leadership.
The US considered bombing Afghanistan as the only viable and reasonable way of dealing with terrorists. This was embodied in President Bush’s utterance when announcing the invasion in 2001: “You are either with us or against us” (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010).
According to the Rational Actor Model, when developing foreign policy, the government and its political leaders always think and act only in a rational way in their pursuit of power and order. This rationality, assumed to be present in groupthink, involves individuals who perceive the world or prevailing circumstances in an accurate manner and reach decision following an open intellectual process. It is thus assumed that the government and its officials have clearly ordered goals, search for relevant information, consider a wide range of alternatives, and eventually settles for an alternative that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the costs (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). In reality, however, goals are hardly clearly states nor rank orders, and alternatives are usually not fully assessed. Therefore, the use of groupthink in most foreign policy matters often results in a flawed decision making particularly in circumstances of immediate crisis or ‘ad hoc episodes.
Relying on group in such situations is problematic because of the inherent dysfunctional group dynamics that lead to a defective decision-making process specifically in the immediate-term. Influenced by false sense of invulnerability, unanimity, and self-righteousness, the decision-making team often overlooks policy options and reaches faulty decisions devoid of sufficient consideration to potential outcomes (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). This was characteristic with the US decision for a military invasion in Afghanistan where the outcomes were unbelievable costs to the US and coalition on the one hand, and the Afghanistan side on the other. It is evident that the core group conducted an insufficient survey of the viable alternatives to war, which implies that the decision to invade Afghanistan was indeed an avoidable error.
Reference:
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (2010). Groupthink versus high-quality decision making in international relations. New York: Columbia University Press.
