Crossing the Line of Departure is your baseline reference for the Signal role in support of the Mission Command War fighting Functio
Section 1
The main aim of the work is to develop the technological techniques that issue commands that control large the military forces that indulge in combat dealing with an armed enemy in the swift paced that have mobility in their actions. The mobility nature of diverse operations occurs through the movement of the military forces that react swiftly to surprise their enemies through their speed of advance and retreat of their enemies. In the current expenditures, it is compared to the operations that are mechanized by the motorized forces. The most modern the operations occur as equated to the harmonized and motorized forces. This also refers to the operational air transport[1]. Based on the pre-mechanized era, the mobile dealings can be described through the predominant forces such as Calvary, although they have the ability of the commanders to swiftly move their forces both operationally and strategically, while retaining control, against the deployed enemy forces.
The focus will be on the operations of United States Army forces; by issuing examples from foreign armies is also an essential aspect. This article is aimed at discussing the development of particular operational techniques that facilitate the command and the control of the forces of the modern battlefield together with the organizational and equipment linked issues[2].
The command and control of these aspects has been evident through ages and they eventually hinder the success at the battlefields. The commander who has control over the armies followed in the intent of their battle and this makes them able to adjust to the changes that are targeted based on their action of their enemies. The complexity is illuminated through the shortened time spans with the ability of making decision through the dispersed forces. This is encouraged through forces of motion of distances although it has various shortcomings for its effectiveness. The actions of their enemies in many campaigns are not easily predictable or have more fluid.
According to the historical aspects, two key are intertwined through the elements that enable the commander to prevail in their upcoming battlefields of technology. Technology is the hardware effective in battles of command meaning that the available chances are preserved for the leaders to control their forces. this is includes voice commands, signal flags, battle flags, field telephones, radios and satellite computer uplinks which are armored to be in the command vehicles and helicopters. Technique is the software that issues command and control process. This illustrates how the commanders organize themselves to lead the forces based on the availed type of technology. The application techniques battle the application dominion that is included through the standardization of units and the operating procedures and courier systems. This ensures that the operations and order of formats implicate maps overlays and graphics. This work analyzes the utilization of technology and technique in the efficiency of the companies.
Section 2
The main aim of battle command is to determine the doctrinal concepts utilized in the army subjects, they include FM 3-0 Operations (formerly 100-5), published in June 2001, and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, published in August 2003. The FM 6-0 supersede section of the previous staff operations manual FM 101-5. These two credentials characterize and sophisticate the Army’s concept of battle command on the move[3]. Battle command is termed as “the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy.” It is different from command in general, this is because the Army terms lawful influence implemented through individuals in the Army over their selected subsidiary based on their rank and position. Battlefield is also the exercise of command in pursuit of outdoing their enemies.
To practice battle commands means that the doctrines outlined in the framework expected to be visualized by the commander so that the aspects of nature and design are speculated. This describes the intent of all the executives based on the availability of time, resources, space and passion of the subordinates. Battle command on the move is evident in various areas of the availed process. Through the visualizing of these aspects the outline of how to execute an operation outlined by the commander who is expected to utilize diverse elements of operational, design outlined in FM 3-0 as tools. These elements are involved primarily with the distinguishing of objectives, and operational pauses. These are the elements available in the mobile campaigns with two elements operating and reaching the tempo that is related to the battle of command[4].
The FM 3-0 outlines the operational reach through the estimated distance through which the military power can be implicated effectively. Tempo is outlined as the rate in which the military acts towards various cases. The operational reach refers to the ability of effective battling command that has a battle extended in a decisive manner. The ability of the commander to control the forces and move in a straightforward manner affects the ability of the project to reach their operational levels[5]. Tempo entails of the speed in which the military forces execute their operations while depending on their mobile systems on the command battle. The battle command requires the seamless continuous forces that maintain a swift tempo that occurs through maneuver and movement. The Subordinate concept of this intent is important for the success of battle command on action. Effective command of mobile operations requires the commander juggling the available communications technology with organizational performance designed to ease the domination of forces in action.
According to the Americans, their first experience with the mobile battle commands started with development of the Yorktown campaign in which the General and Commander in chief took the initiative of executing the maneuver. George Washington initiated this battle and he chose it at the expense of the British who failed to react swiftly based on the abrupt result of the situation. Focused on his battle command technique for this operation, Washington worked in close contact with the French commander Rochambeau and got along with the advance element of the force, stopping at various times to review progress as the force passed by and then moving forward again to make sure everything was working according to his design.
Based on a campaign held in Mexico City in the year 1897, the major General declared that he had conducted an advance that was the same to that of Washington though the recent research entailed of two phases. Mr. Scott had access to a less group of well-trained forces that had developed through a single axis that existed against majority of the Mexican based oppositions.
Considering the initial advances, it was evident that the logistical combination based on the personal shortcomings indicated a pause extension. This led to the shift of the Mexican capitals through unexpected directions. Scott managed to take control of the forces through the motivation of his subordinates leading to the separation of forces towards the forward, middle and following elements[6]. The American Civil War triggered the mass armies in the experience of the United States. This led to the development of the industrial age technological levels finally viewed as the military tactics. These aspects made the battle command to move and eventually depend entirely on a single organization and the utmost implications of the available technology.
Section 3
After duration of many years, several technological advances have been innovated leading to the control and command of the armies as telegraph and railways developed in the 19th century. Eventually, the Napoleonic wars and campaigns began opposing the armies composed of many corps as in various fields[7]. These campaigns were on a large scale aspect and it was difficult to handle them, for example after the loss of the Napoleon battle in the year 1813 campaign when the subordinates began to maturely blow the bridge of River Elster. This development meant that the means of communication and transport had to be enhanced, with immediate effect based on the command and the control in the American Civil War as many of the untimely troop movements, and campaigns were carried out through the alignment of infantry. During the late stages of the war, railroads were allowed to be used by the higher commanders to redeploy their forces that had been situated in distant positions and their telegraphs had commanders controlling the actions of the troops.
Emerging Technologies
This technological advancement had a couple of emptiness based on the theater of wars and the large size of armies that opposed them. There were civil war battles that commanded the corps with a level that was challenging and distinct[8]. In the period before the implication of corded military aspects, there were graphics and control measures that led to confusion of the reigned region. Technological development in communications and transportation created their initial impacts during the war by the American military. There were various advantages evident with innovation of technology; the commanders had the chance of moving the troop bodies over great distances in a relative manner and they had less impact based on the tactical operations and the battle command although they were focused on the destruction of the rail lines as military in low levels. The utilization of instantaneous communications among the commanders and their sub-ordinates to the level of corps and they were evident during the divisional levels, paving way for the army and theatre commanders had no control he forces that lie below them while trying to reach their couriers[9].
The new electric telegraph developed because of the geographical aspects of the United States more than any evident compact in Europe. This was the first major technological advancement since the domestication of horses. The telegraphs were replaced by the courier systems that survived longer distances and it was eventually used tactically though the prior technological models hindered its effectiveness. Eventually the field telephones were implicated with telegraphs being tied close to wire lines and eventually placed on the ground on poles. The positioning of the wires enabled communication although the appliances required trained contractors.
During the decline of the war, telegraph lines developed from the headquarters to all present divisions. It was usual that the executives and the staff had small headquarters based on all units above the division in size. Both telegraphic and couriers were used in universal levels leading to the augmentation of traditional aspects of technology[10]. The American civil was distinguished through the slow operations executed in the matching pace of the infantry. This was similar to some of the Napoleons operations that made the war to succeed as command and control was rapidly moving the armies.
Endnotes
John A. Tilley, the British Navy and the American Revolution, p. 38, 84, and 114
McGrath, J. J., & Combat Studies Institute (U.S.), crossing the line of departure: Battle command on the move: a historical perspective, p. 63, 137, and 144.
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Battle Command Visualization 101: Prototype Embedded Training on Networked Sensors p. 26, 41, 86, and 129.
References
John A. Tilley (Columbia). (1987) The British Navy and the American Revolution, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
McGrath, J. J., & Combat Studies Institute (U.S.). (2006). Crossing the line of departure: Battle command on the move : a historical perspective. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press.
Top of Form
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (2004). Battle Command Visualization 101: Prototype Embedded Training on Networked Sensors. Alexandria, Va: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Bottom of Form
[1] John A. Tilley (Columbia). (1987) The British Navy and the American Revolution, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
[2] McGrath, J. J., & Combat Studies Institute (U.S.). (2006). Crossing the line of departure: Battle command on the move : a historical perspective. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press.
[3] McGrath, J. J., & Combat Studies Institute (U.S.). (2006). Crossing the line of departure: Battle command on the move : a historical perspective. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press.
[4] John A. Tilley (Columbia). (1987) The British Navy and the American Revolution, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
[5] U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (2004). Battle Command Visualization 101: Prototype Embedded Training on Networked Sensors. Alexandria, Va: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
[6] John A. Tilley (Columbia). (1987) The British Navy and the American Revolution, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
[7] McGrath, J. J., & Combat Studies Institute (U.S.). (2006). Crossing the line of departure: Battle command on the move : a historical perspective. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press.
[8] U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (2004). Battle Command Visualization 101: Prototype Embedded Training on Networked Sensors. Alexandria, Va: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
[9] John A. Tilley (Columbia). (1987) The British Navy and the American Revolution, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
[10] U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (2004). Battle Command Visualization 101: Prototype Embedded Training on Networked Sensors. Alexandria, Va: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
