Napoleon Bonaparte
“A Revolution is an idea which has found its bayonets” – Napolean Bonaparte.
Introduction
The above statement would be expanded as follows: A Revolution is in essence the radical execution of a consolidated, logical socio-political idea that is reinforced by consistent, violent force together with strength of arms. The statement implies that ideology is the primary determinant of a Revolution.
Background
Revolutionary ideology is the influential, poignant rallying force that holds together a Revolutionary. In addition, it is the logical strategy that informs the direction and purpose of a Revolution (Connaughton 2002, p. 30). In this regard, it is fair to argue that Revolutionary ideology is indeed synonymous with the real Revolution itself. This ideology became popular during the ideals of liberty of the French Revolution (1789) and in subsequent Revolutions inspired by Liberalism and Nationalism in the 1840s (Proudhon 2007, p.71).
Nonetheless, torrents of abstract Revolutionary philosophy are primarily mere theories with no effect whatsoever. For an idea to qualify as Revolutionary, therefore, it needs to be viewed in the perspective of Revolutionary political movements (Englund 2010, p. 282). This especially because the Revolutionary political movements depict the consolidation as well as institutionalization of Revolutionary ideology in addition to being in charge of organizing and heading the Revolution itself. Prime examples of these include the National Assembly (1789-1791), the Legislative Assembly (1797-1792), and the Convention (1792-1793), the Commission for Public Safety (1793), the French Revolution (1789), as well in the 1848 Revolutions particularly the Provisional Republican Government of France and the Vorparlament (German states) (Todorov & Hoffmann 2005, p. 17).
In this regard, it can be rightly espoused that the term “idea” as used by Napolean Bonaparte in his quote “A Revolution is an idea that has found its bayonets” is in direct reference to the Revolutionary and bodies (Revolution (Connaughton 2002, p. 37). If we tear into this statement, we are able to find the weaknesses. First, Napolean tends to suggest that a Revolutionary Body has the greatest responsibility in orchestrating a Revolution. Further, the inference is to the effect that it is in control of violent popular force. Still, the Revolutionary ideology is said to be both cohesive and coherent. Finally, it is held that it is within the power of the Revolutionary Body to determine the entire process and end result of a Revolution (Frey & Frey, 2004 p. 154).
Aim
`This paper seeks to challenge these four assertions of Napoleon’s statement by bringing out its over-simplicity and inaccuracy.
Scope
First, this paper argues to the effect that the Revolutionary Body was often not the primary origin of Revolution because the movement itself was founded during the revolutionary process due a multiplicity of other factors. Secondly, it is espoused that the perceived control of the Revolutionary body over the violent masses of people was significantly limited and that its continued existence was subject to mass approval. Thirdly, this paper proves that the coherence of ideology was betrayed by the emergence of divergent factions in the Revolutionary Body resulting in internal power struggles at the expense of interests of Revolution. Finally, this paper argues that the operation of the Revolutionary body depended on the rapidly changing currents of revolutions, translating that it wielded insignificant control over both the process and end result of a Revolution.
Causal factor for Revolution
A Revolution often results from faults in the existing political structure together with a number of socio-economic issues that compromise the legitimacy of the state (Englund 2010, p. 283). During this conditions, there is often the consolidation of a Revolutionary ideology, which implies that the idea is largely reactionary. On this basis, it is misleading for Napolean to infer that a Revolutionary Body is the principal origin of a Revolution because it usually stems from pre-revolutionary conditions.
There is plenty of evidence from the French Revolution (1789) to this effect – prior to the Revolution, it is known that there had been a complex of social tensions following a series of poor state decree, far reaching financial mismanagement, and unfortunate economic circumstances facing the nation. The net result of this was waning of confidence in the Monarchy, confluence of discontentment among the different classes, as well as severe economic problems (Proudhon 2007, p.73). In response, there was sensational formation of the National Assembly resulting from the unexpected combination of such specific events as the meeting of the Estate Generals leading to the consolidation of a Revolutionary ideology led by the Third Estate.
Nonetheless, at this point, these circumstances had only served to created a revolutionary mood. Ultimately, the Revolution was sparked by fear coupled with the paranoia of particularly the urban masses for a possible military retaliation sanctioned by the French Monarchy (Todorov & Hoffmann 2005, p. 18). In an immediate, spontaneous reaction, rioting crowds stormed through the Bastille in the hunt for guns and gunpowder. This is evidentiary to the existence of varied causal factors for the French Revolution, and thus Revolutionary Ideology in itself was but an indirect trigger.
In the 1848 Revolutions, the popular belief among the existing powers was that they were as a result of coordinated pan-European ideological conspiracy (Hanson 2009, p. 124). On the contrary, the Revolutions were largely triggered by socio-economic issues similar to the causal factors of the French Revolution (1789). Other significant causes included distinct class tensions due to industrial urbanization as well as rapid economic growth. While it can advanced that the movements emerged as a reaction to long-standing political oppression of the Metternich, the eventual outbreaks were spontaneous and not planned beforehand. The relevance of Revolutionary bodies only came into being after the respective outbreaks (Herold 2002, p. 85). In this respect, it is evident that Revolutionary Ideology did not directly trigger the 1848 Revolutions.
Control over Violent Masses
Mobilization of violent, popular masses is an essential aspect in a Revolution. This is particularly the case because the crowds are usually emotionally volatile, uncoordinated and with varying interests. Therefore, while Revolutionary may manipulate and incite the masses at times, the rioting people usually act on basis of their own judgment or in reaction to some fear (Todorov & Hoffmann 2005, p. 21). This means that the Revolutionary Bodies wield insignificant power over the crows, and indeed the success of such bodies largely depend on their ability to align themselves with the interests of the crowds. During the radical phase of the French Revolution, the influence of the Robespierre and the Jacobins was greater because of their effort to implement the ‘Maximum’ as well as taking a radical stance that resonated well with the demands and concerns of the urban masses (Hanson 2009, p. 126). However, the Jacobins thereafter lost the support of the crowds when the ‘Maximum’ failed and their fears slightly allayed. This testifies that the Jacobins only enjoyed the support and trust of the masses as long the latter believed the former were serving their interests (Baker 1990, p. 18).
In the same manner, during the 1848 French Revolution, the reaction of the masses was violent when the conservative Republicans (highly influential in the Constituent Assembly), took the decision to do away with the National Workshops. Prior to that, the Revolution had the support of many people in the working class because it represented their need for employment and money (Herold 2002, p. 89). When these needs were no longer met, the working class felt highly betrayed making them to rise against the Revolution. This goes to show that the masses had their independent interests and were not bound by the Revolutionary Ideology (Jordan 2012, p. 1795).
Coherence of Ideology
On the surfaces, the people in a Revolutionary Body are deemed to be pushing a common agenda and ideology. The reality is that such a body is usually composed of different factions harboring distinctly different belief, perspectives and objectives (Herold 2002, p. 94). The constant struggle for power or dominance often results in division, making the different factions to follow individual interests with Machiavellian expediency as opposed to rallying behind a common ideology. During the French Revolution (1789), there were deep hostility within the Convention between the Radicals (Jacobins) on the one hand and the Moderates (Girondins) on the other (Englund 2010, p. 288). The vicious struggle for powers had far reaching negative implications on the Revolution and the nation at large.
The ‘Reign of Terror’ became synonymous with the Jacobins, commonly referred to as ‘despotism of liberty’ – a stance that was totally contrary to the Revolutionary ideology. In the long run, this radical expediency led to political isolation together with widespread paranoia ending in the execution of Robespierre during the Thermidorian Reaction. This effectively brought an end to the reign of terror (Proudhon 2007, p.79). This was succeeded by a reactionary ‘White Terror’ that saw different groups embark on revenge mission against the Jacobins. The intra-revolutionary violence brought to the fore the lack of congruence in the Revolutionary Ideology and dealt a blow to the Revolutionary process by stirring up a long-lasting atmosphere of suspicion and fear (Knox 2007, p. 33). Likewise, the lack of ideological coherence in the 1848 Revolutions in France, Germany and Australia resulted in ideological division that eventually contributed to the demise of the Revolutions (Hanson 2009, p. 168). This is proof that incoherent ideology has counter-productive effects and results in defective Revolution.
Determination of Revolution Process and Outcome
The French Revolution (1789) and the subsequent 1848 Revolution in France, widely acclaimed for popular sovereignty and liberty, resulted in the establishment of autocratic monarchies i.e. the First and the Second French empires respectively (Bailyn 2012, p.38). This was not the initial ideological goal of either of the Revolutions. Their outcomes point to the fact that Revolutionary bodies are usually unable to sustain the initial Revolutionary ideal of a Revolution because a host of difficulties and challenges of state administration along with pressures of Revolution often overwhelm them fear (Knox 2007, p. 37).
The political change that emerged following both the French Revolution (1789) and the 1848 Revolutions did not translate in eradication of prevailing socio-economic problems. In fact, the social problems of the French people were made worse by the destabilizing and effects of both revolutionaries (Bailyn 2012, p.49). There was a looming threat for counter-revolution from both the inside and the outside. Ideology was therefore not qualified to addressing these pressing issues, thus forcing the Revolutionary bodies to rely greatly on expediency and pragmatism (Hanson 2009, p. 156). In other words, the process end result of the Revolution were not influenced by the Revolutionary Ideology per se, as it depended on the ability of the Revolutionary bodies to tackle the issues and problems affecting the nation.
Conclusion
This paper has thus advanced an argument to the effect that while Ideology is a key element of Revolution, it is not the major determinant of its origin, process and indeed its end-results. The scope of this paper has determined that a revolution is influenced by multifarious and volatile factors that render Revolution a particularly complex and unpredictable phenomenon. The general conclusion of this paper, therefore, is that Napoleon Bonaparte’s famous quote “A revolution is an idea that has found its bayonets” is over simplistic and inaccurate.
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