Abstract
The article describes the steps the PBSA (Perform Based Service Acquisition), a government approach that was chosen and proposed to manage contracts that the government offers to private contractors. The approach policy sets specifications of the results of any given government contract and chose to ignore the processes through which contracts are contained in. Majority of the managers have played a great part in improving and implementing the policy when contracted by the government; but besides that, there exist numerous resource material on the policy written to serve contracting agencies with the knowledge on the expected qualifications and regulations that they are supposed meet. The first section of the policy bases its conditions on small contracts such as repairs and maintenance contracts that the government may offer private contractors. The second part of the policy focuses its Intel on long-term contracts that may be complex to complete and its results. Such long-term contracts include infrastructural development projects or technological development projects.
The article further addresses the history of the PBSA, as well as its detailed description. This description dates back to 1979, when the first government contract specification policy was established by the members of the U.S. Air force. Office of Economic Opportunity had also come up with some preset conditions and regulations that were meant to govern education contract acquisition. Various concerns on agency contracts as the article describes, arose in 1991, leading the FAR to implementing of the policy. This policy was later on amended by the same organization, FAR, in 1997. However, the success of the policy is highly questionable and the article has brought forward the reasons as to why this is the case. Edwards and Nash have stipulated that the weakness of the policy is the impractical focus on acquisition of Long-term and Complex services. Complex services are always liable to change, delays and complications and thus demanding agencies to predetermine the terms of the services, the outcomes, the time and the objectives can be defined as impractical focus.
The article has also specified the nature of the services offered as well as their quality. The authors have pointed out the inconsiderateness of the PBSA on the difference between services and supplies. The difference is noted to be the fact that services require human relationships in order to be achieved whereas supplies have been seen to solely depend on the production rate that is at times independent of human relationships. The government fails to have this consideration in the policy, which is disadvantageous and oppressing for these agencies. Contract assortment and pricing have also been revisited. The PBSA allows the pricing to be controlled through competitive means by firms. This is seen to be of sole advantage to the government as the client. Besides pricing, enforcement (Price Reduction, Damages and Terminations) have not been left unattended by the authors. Contractor selection by the government according to the policy is conducted considering competence levels of the contractors. This clause of the policy is enforced in the event there are several contractors that are competing for a government contract. There is a preset criterion through which competency among the agencies is judged.
The article concludes in the authors proposing that, though the PBSA has managed to contain several irregularities in contracts, it is the time that OFPP (Office of Federal Procurement Policy) a branch that exclusively deals with contracts, devices a better policy or a way through which relational contracting will be evaluated. The proposed policy should also include several people from all fields of the contract relations.
Reference
Edwards, J. V. & Nash, R. (2007, September). “A Proposal For A New Approach To Performance-Based Services Acquisition.” Defense Acquisition Review Journal. Pg. 352 – 367.
