Hyatt Walkway Collapse
Analysis
History of the collapse
The Hyatt walk away collapse incident occurred in the year 1981 in Kansas City. There a large crowd of people dancing in a party, organized in the Hyatt hotel. The collapse of the walk way took place as the dancers above the floor enjoyed themselves in dance. The collapse is due to its fatal nature became an issue of concern in the United States history. The construction of the Hyatt structure originates from the works of the Crown work Redevelopment Corporation in 1976 that were the pioneers of the design plus construction of the Hyatt regency hotel. The structural engineer in process Gillium- Colaco was responsible for the subcontract. He stood for the firm, which were their subsidiary, named jack D. gallium &Associates. The selection done for the architects were from the PBNDLML planners.
The Hyatt pathway collapse was due to an overstress of the link detail designed. The place could only withstand a capacity of only thirty percent. An excess of the load lead to the crumple. To prevent this, they ought to have minimized on the number of attendees but in the case of engineering, consideration was to be according to the purpose of the building. The chain of errors and opportunities missed to correct the errors played a part in the collapse of the building. This was not just one simple mistake that ultimately led to the tragedy since the original design was inadequate.
The contractor originated from the Eldrigde construction Company that was given a sub contract for the fabrication plus the erection of atrium steel for the walkway. The construction consisted persons with dissimilar roles. There was the design team from the PBNDML. The GCE were responsible for control of whole project. The party responsible for contracting was Eldridge Company. There were two agencies accountable for the inspection process, which were the Human resource plus the investigating engineer. The Hyatt hotel was to contain three sections, which were a 40-story tower segment plus a function block and a linking atrium. The accident occurrence was in the atrium, in a big open region about 117 feet wide by 145 feet long. The height was reaching about 50 feet. PBNDML had prepared the required specifications for the project. GCE and haven fabrication contractor did the engineering drawings where the havens contractor used the drawings for the purposes of making the shops fabrication drawings.
Main body
The problem resulting to the collapse resulted from the constructor’s change of the original design provided by GCE. They altered various features that led to structural weakness. The atrium catwalk design was for the purpose of the second plus the fourth floors. The suspension of the walk way was to occur from continuous steel rods of suitable length and anchored in the upper limit. The location of the third and the second walkways required suspension from the ceiling as it were with the commencing walkway. The design was such a were that it would withstand any weight since the designers of the original one took into considerations all the factors to ensure a firm foundation plus a unique structure with all features of structural requirements.
The persons responsible for the design processes in the first place prepared specifications. The rods were to end with nuts plus washers and existed as threaded to perform the leveling of plus adjustments of nuts plus the threaded rods. The GCE provision of design drawings was capable of constructing a firm stricter if the persons involved in then construction followed the design criteria. The engineer in charge of the project provided various sketches for the walkway in which the design procedures indicated. The calculated loads plus the data on the box beams was vital for the process. The problem was that not all sketches conveyed with the drawings for the construction of the structure. The design became a problem due to the alterations of rods for suspending the catwalk of the second floor. The ceilings from which the rods were to be suspended were missing. The problem was with the contractor whose ignorance caused the collapse resulting to deaths of several people.
He would have inquired the transportation of the missing sketches depicting the look of the catwalk. If he were, sharp enough he would discover the structure hitch. The assumption is that he was in a hurry to finish the project as the schedule suggested without considering the impacts of his actions. If the contractor followed the correct procedures, the building would not have collapsed. The process called for the adherence of the design criteria that required time. The materials would consume time leading to delays which the contractor did not intend to follow. There was a requirement from the formal design in making a threading of the whole design. Insertion of the nuts plus the bolts focused on links between the rods plus the nuts and the ceiling of the atrium.
This erection called for high spending on the material plus labor leading to high costs. The persons responsible for the construction were afraid of the costs involved. However, they were not considering the results of their actions. The Havens concern of the threads appearing on the rod damaged altered the look of the structure in the process under construction. The havens thus altered the appearance to a single plus two-way hanger rod linking the fourth story catwalk. These actions by haven made it easy for the construction due to the removal of the need for including the threading in the whole rod. The removal of threading led to the use of short rods in the construction.
The short rods plus the lack of threads in the rods depicted structural weakness. The controversial issue on whether the GCE had contacted the Havens on the procedures and the changes made on the drawings. The mix up shows the avoidance of responsibility and ignorance between the persons involved. The persons responsible for the inspection process followed the instructions through following the procedures in investigating the cause of the collapse. The investigations depicted that the collapse resulted from the connection hitch of the steel structures. Improper inspection on the walkway resulted to the collapse. After checking the rest of the building, the inspection teams were satisfied with their work. The ignorance in them caused deaths of several people after the collapse.
The overall problem originates from the design changes and the lack of communication between the responsible persons. The structural failure is associated with the steel arrangements, which lacked achievement during the construction. One would argue that if the walkway was designed in such a manner that allowed its swinging. The structure rigidity was not sufficient to support the weight of the rest of the stories. The dancing of the people in the walkway created a certain frequency (resonance) which coincided with the natural frequency of the walkway structure. This resulted to collapse because the structure did not withstand the weight and the frequency generated by the dancing people plus the music in the party. However, the persons constructing the building did not consider these aspects of structural strengths, which was a problem that led to the tragedy. The shearing forces caused the failure due to lack of firm foundation supporting the floors. For example, the second floor could not withstand the weight of the third floor due to wrong structural supports.
Part 2
As an engineer, I would have threaded the original devise and the entire length of the rode that was long to install a core under the stage box in the fourth floor. After inserting the rod, the core of the fourth floor stage walk -box would be installed after the installation of the rod in the second floor catwalk beam box requiring extensive scaffolding for completion of the connection. This was to result to a considerably higher cost in erection. The gears on the rod could be damaged during the erection process therefore using of the resources from the projects of the “inspection team” in the investigation of the collapse of the roof would help. The investigations determined that the collapse of the roof occurred due to defective roof links. Fixing of the problem would have lead to stability of the stage walk floor. Checking of the walkway connections and the structural details would have confirmed the stability of the floors but this was not performed. A systematic design check of all the steel relations in the design was to be done by the G.C.E. designers of which they did not.
The crumple of the walkways cracked water pipes in the entrance hall flooding the main entrance of the hotel. Accomplishing of the designs build of perfection by great engineers would have sustained the buildings strength. This would have led to no loss of life of the attendees and the performers. However, rescue efforts were fast and well synchronized. More than forty rescue trucks swiftly converged on the site from all over the City of Kansas municipal area and helicopters were used to take the injured to area hospitals. Aiding the rescue efforts were scores of doctors in town for a Radiology convention who happened to be dining in the hotel at the time of the accident. Because of the double rod design change initiated by Havens, the load at the nut on the fourth floor upper rod section was twice the load of the original single rod design.
The investigation discovered that the original design could only support sixty percent of the load required by the building code. The shop drawing change to a two-rod design doubled the load at the fourth floor connection, meaning that as constructed, the connection could only bear thirty percent of the mandated load. The steel-to-steel connection is what ultimately failed and resulted in the accident. Therefore, a historical perspective of design responsibility for steel-to-steel connections is in order. The due precaution mechanisms of the construction work must be followed to avoid a repeat of the Hyatt tragedy. That is, all the stakeholders, people in the neighborhood as well as pedestrians should be adequately notified of the construction work that is going on in a particular area. Some other dangers related to the construction and nature of the building must be clear to everyone. A storey building or walkway would be too dangerous in the event of collapse. Such safety measures would minimize the number of casualties if any, in the event of a collapse or fire.
As an engineer, I would have threaded the original devise and the entire length of the rode that was long to install a core under the stage box in the fourth floor. After inserting the rod, the core of the fourth floor stage walk box would have to be installed after the installation of the rod in the second floor catwalk beam box requiring extensive scaffolding for completion of the connection. This was to result to a considerably higher cost in erection. The gears on the rod could have been damaged during the erection process therefore using of the resources from the projects of the “inspection team” in the investigation of the collapse of the roof would help. The investigations that put fourth determined that the collapse of the roof occurred due to defective roof links. Fixing of the problem would have lead to stability of the stage walk floor. Checking of the walkway connections and the structural details would have confirmed the stability of the floors but this was not done. A thorough design check of all the steel relations in the design was to be done the G.C.E. designers of which they did not.
The crumple of the walkways cracked water pipes in the entrance hall flooding the main entrance of the hotel. Accomplishing of the designs build of perfection by great engineers would have sustained the buildings strength. This would have led to no loss of life of the attendees and the performers. However, rescue efforts were fast and well synchronized. More than forty rescue trucks swiftly converged on the site from all over the City of Kansas municipal area and helicopters were used to take the injured to area hospitals. Aiding the rescue efforts were scores of doctors in town for a Radiology convention who happened to be dining in the hotel at the time of the accident. Because of the double rod design change initiated by Havens, the load at the nut on the fourth floor upper rod section was twice the load of the original single rod design.
The investigation discovered that the original design could only support sixty percent of the load required by the building code. The shop drawing change to a two-rod design doubled the load at the fourth floor connection, meaning that as constructed, the connection could only bear thirty percent of the mandated load. The steel-to-steel connection is what ultimately failed and resulted in the accident. Therefore, a historical perspective of design responsibility for steel-to-steel connections is in order.
In essence, the failure that occurred in this case emerged because of the mistakes of the engineers. Not all the necessary steps in engineering ethics were taken into account hence making serious damages that also resulted to the loss of life. Reducing the equipment costs and applying cost benefit relations was all that resulted to improper functionality of the structure. As an engineer I would have taken well-set actions and follow the ethically principles that would have resulted to amicable solutions. In this case, the design check of the steel construction and appropriate evaluation measures would have been the right solution. The purpose of the engineered structure would also be my main concern since the holding capacity of the people in it would have defiantly played a significant role .since the building was a hotel, its holding capacity would differ from normal residential ones.
