Melanesian Concepts of “Dividual” and “Partible” Characterize Personhood and Agency Contrary to Western “Individual” and “Egocentric Personhood”
Concepts of “Dividual” and “Partible”
To the Melanesian agency, the “dividual” is the relationally constituted person. A person in this definition is a creation of the fusion and plural composition of various relationships, which create them. The Melanesian “Dividual” is unique since it entails the total of the dependent and interdependent multiple facets born of others and from others, rather than the autonomous western concept. The Melanesian personhood and agency are also the reconstructions of the “Partible.” In this case, the “partible” represents every substance and object that creates a person. It puts them in a network with others that are relational. This is unlike the western definition for person, where the “individual” is the self-authority. The need for self-reflection and personal capacity for action also make up the western “individual.” The goal of this research is to discuss these aspects as they relate to the Melanesian “dividual” and “partible” as part of the society’s personhood and agency. These aspects in comparison with the western identification of the “individual” and “personhood,” show the relational and personhood aspects.
To the Melanesian, the “dividual” represents a persona or societal aspect that is a creation of the continuous combination of various substances. Substances like nurture, initiation, conception and social rituals make up the dividual. In this context, a person is a fleeting and unitary actor that is provisional as they have an orientation towards relationships, which make them or embed them. This is the Melanesian definition of personhood that is in a correlation with agency. Melanesian agency is the relational aspect of the “dividual.” This implies that, for the Melanesian, the relations the dividual has with objects, substances, ritual, activities, and others make up the agency. This is a social interaction, which occurs between the various concepts of “dividual,” which represents the Melanesian “partible” in the agency context.
For example, in Malenesia the Pasinja Meri, is a persona and an agency that is the creation of the cultural and economic structures of the Huli. This “dividual” is a creation is that continually mobile giving it its unique identity different from other personas in the community. Mobility to this “dividual” is synonymous to the persona’s freedom and autonomy. The author shows that the Pasinja Meri is a social agency that arises from the mobility, which gives life to their history and life. The relation this agency has with the Huli society is a result of the interactions this group of people has with the different places, people, and cultures. This gives an excellent example of the Melanesian’s “dividual” externalization and activities that lead it to exchange with substances in its “partible” context. This personhood and relational context are different from the western “individual” that is autonomous and has self-authority. This “individual” has self-reflection and capacity to act on his or her own creating the western “agency.” To Wardlow, the western “individual” and “agency” are structures and concepts of a heuristic symbol of an actor that acts in the realm of their actions and desires.
Given the number of interactions and relations a “dividual” can have with objects, substances, and cultures, it is easy to conclude that the Pasinja Meri does not have a clear definition. This is because the agency is a construction of different practices, personal meanings, and motivations. This is the difference between the Melanesian and Westen concepts. This is so as the Melanesian see the self-identity of the Pasinja Meri have gone beyond the social institutions. Self-identity that goes beyond the boundaries of the social institutions is the ideal western “individualism.”
Reference
Wardlow, H. (2006). Wayward Women Sexuality and Agency In a New Guinea Society. London: University of California.
