Presidency and Congress
The relation of power between the executive and the legislature in the United States has existed for a long time. The presidency and Congress as two major branches of the American government have been known to engage in battle in the effort to formulate the political agenda as well as define the goals of the state. This state of affairs exists from the American constitutional order that provides for formal separation of powers between the two. Such a structure is said to have legitimized perpetual conflict between the President and Congress extending an invitation to struggle (Huntington, 1965). The system of checks and balances ensures that struggle between the president and Congress is always there as the former is charged with implementing laws and spending money (in budget) that have been passed by latter. The two institutions are known to be inherently in confrontation, inspired by contradictory and often non-negotiable interests, goals, and point of views that results in political dissonance (Greenberg, 1989). Congress is therefore judged on the basis of whether it has catered to or defeated by the president.
The degree to which the President of the United States is able to capitalize on his party’s majority in Congress depends largely on the degree to which he is able to win their support. In such a separated system, the support of the President is never automatic because more support is wielded from his own party in Congress as compared to the opposition party. Indeed, the degree of support among the President’s party varies from one administration to another, between the House and Senate, as well as between the two parties (Greenberg, 1989). Members from the president’s party in Congress often share similar political goals together with policy preferences, and anticipate to be judged by the electorate at the next election on the president’s record to some extent.
However, it must be noted that either congressional party is constituted by members of divergent views which translates the disciplinary powers of central party leaders are significantly limited. As such, the capacity of presidents and parties to structure voting is relatively weaker than strong party systems found in Britain (Huntington, 1965). Since the 1950s, the initially strong electoral ties between a president and members of his party in Congress has waned considerably as the advantages of the incumbent have decreases the effects of clinching presidential candidates’ coat tails. The ideological and partisan composition of Congress thus places real restrictions on the ability of the president to pocket congressional approval of proposed legislation. Most recent presidents have come to terms with the strategic limitations enforced on their presidency and have conveniently sought optimal strategies with Congress (Greenberg, 1989).
A major strategic context in which the powers of the president and the Congress matter in legislation is the more unending policy environment centered principally on Congress. This is especially the case because the legislate agenda of Congress is usually larger than that of the president. In this regard, whenever the president enters the legislative arena, he is often forced to accommodate himself to a continuous process that is law-making which is pegged on Congress (Huntington, 1965). On few occasion, the president may serve as a crucial player in the law-making process, especially when it comes to designating legislative priorities. However, on most occasions Congress continues to enact legislation without input of the president or parallel to the efforts of the president (Greenberg, 1989). In general, therefore, the separated system in America gives substantial fluidity and ambiguity into the relationship between the president and Congress particularly in the legislative arena.
Hunnington captures Congress’ dilemma in realizing both legitimacy and effectiveness by asserting that “If Congress legislates, it subordinates itself to the President; if it refuses to legislate, it alienates itself from public opinion. Congress can assert its power of it can pass laws; but it cannot do both” (p.6). The ascendancy of the presidency often comes at the expense of Congress, and vice versa. At one time, the president may wield much power and dominate the relationship and by extension the major governance issues (Huntington, 1965). At another time, however, Congress may reassert its authority and take over the position of leading institution of the two.
In conclusion, the president needs to work with Congress so as to accomplish the policy initiatives and changes of this administration. Congress exerts control over the budget demanding of the President to find a way to work it so as to accomplish any of his goals. On the other hand, the President wields veto powers over legislation in addition to being the head of the executive or bureaucratic branch, translating the Congress has to cooperate with the President in order to avoid conflicts and time-consuming roadblocks. The interdependence between the two institutions is rather strong, necessitating compromise on most matters.
References:
Huntington, S.(1965). “Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century,” in The Congress and America’s Future, ed. David B. Truman.
Greenberg, E. S. (1989). The American political system: A radical approach. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman.
