Relationship between Turkey and Syria and the War

Abstract
This paper seeks to point out and generally analyze the problems that exists between Turkey and Syria and the core causes of these problems as well as pointing out both the severity and nature of these conflicts.

Introduction
In the 20th century, Turkey has not been a major player in the affairs at Middle East. However, during the past decade or so, this scenario has changed completely. Under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002, Turkey has improved its diplomatic relations with other middle Eastern countries including Syria, Iraq and Iran (Aras &Koni, 2001). Turkey went ahead to take up the leadership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) attended conferences held by the Arab League and even sent their military forces to Lebanon for contribution to the UN forces. However, Turkey’s diplomatic engagements with Hamas and Iran has managed to bring up differences between Ankara, Washington and Tel Aviv (Schleifer, 2011).
Over the last decade, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria have developed at a very dramatic pace. At first, the relationship rapidly improved but this has come to worsen over the recent few months (Zakaria, 2007). This strain to the two countries’ relations has mainly been due to the Assad regime’s onslaught of his enemies. Though there exists such strains in these two countries’ relations, Syria remains an important factor in Turkey’s plans to become both a political and economic leader in the middle east (Schleifer, 2011).
While the aims mentioned above were influential in Turkey’s decision to strengthen diplomatic ties with Damascus in recent years, the growing concerns about what impact the Syrian uprising would have domestically to Ankara’s security has been the main factor in determining whether Ankara would make a complete break-up of diplomatic ties with Assad regime and even the consideration of using stronger tools such as sanctions and/or the threat of military force to try and stop the brutal response that this regime has taken on the Syrian protesters (Schleifer, 2011). Ankara has expressed its readiness to settle on even tougher sanctions against Damascus in addition to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s verbal condemnation to Assad’s regime, this, however, may prove quite difficult due to the negative consequences it may have to Turkey domestically (Davutoglu & Derinlik, 2001):
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Historically
Conflict between Turkey and Syria run back more than eight decades when both Turkey and Syria claimed the ownership of the disputed Hatav/Alexandria region but was later adopted as Turkish in a referendum. Similarly, during the cold war, the two countries also found themselves on opposing sides of that time’s ideological divide. However, relations between Turkey and Syria worsened the most in 1998 and got to the point where Ankara was ready to unleash military action against Damascus. This conflict was brought about by Syria’s support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which was banned in Turkey and also for protecting its PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan (Aras &Koni, 2001)
.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is usually credited with the improvement of Turkey-Syria diplomatic ties especially due to its “zero problems with neighbours” policy, however, it is important to note that the policy was actually put in place by Ismail Cem in the 1990’s who was the acting foreign minister at the time (Schleifer, 2011). Cem also improved Turkey’s relations with Greece during his tenure and even the improved diplomacy between Turkey, Iran and Syria can be traced back to when Cem was in the office. However, the first true breakthrough in Ankara-Damascus relations can be traced back to the year 2000 when president Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended Hafez Al-Assad’s funeral, a longtime Syrian leader. In 2004, the Syrian president Bashar AlAssad visited Turkey, making it the first time ever for a Syrian leader to do so (Zakaria, 2007). This also was the year that saw the signing of the free trade agreement and a strategic partnership treaty. In 2009, the two countries strengthened these ties further by banning the use of visas for travelling between the two countries.
No Problems Policy
Initially, Turkey responded slowly and ambiguously to the brutality employed by the Syrian government to its protesters. This can be based on its concerns of how the Syrian unrest could affect both their economical and social welfare regionally and domestically.
Regionally, Turkey is holding back from breaking all its breaking ties with Syria since in Turkey’s perspective, this may provide an opportunity for other interested parties such as Iran to increase their influence in Syria by assuming the position that Ankara now holds. Similarly, the fall of the Assad regime may lead to the rise of the of a Summit dominated leadership which will also give Saudi Arabia a chance of a life time to increase its influence on Syria at Turkey’s expense. Beyond this regional concerns, Ankara’s response to the unrest in Syria is mostly influenced by the foreseeable domestic impacts which include:
Economic Impact
By cutting off ties with Syria, Turkey stands to lose a huge chunk of their export market. Syria is also an important transit route for traders in Turkey who use it to access other parts f the middle east. Even more of concern to Turkey is the fact that the unrest of Syria’s Kurds may influence Turkey’s Kurdish people into unrest and leading to instability particularly in the largely Kurdish dominated southeast region which is already in tension.
Due to the concerns mentioned above, Ankara appears to be frightened by the rapid fall of Assad’s regime which may cause a power vaccum to exist, Turkey is thus pushing for a more gradual process which will lead to reforms just as it happened in Turkey.
In conclusion, it’s clear that Ankara’s influence over Damascus is rapidly dwindling. This can be seen through the initial try by Ankara to persuade Assad to adopt quick reforms as demanded by the protesters. These efforts failed miserably and Ankara’s contact with Damascus was quickly shut down, this has forced Ankara to settle on more punitive measures e.g. hosting meetings of Syrian opposition groups. At the moment, Turkey risks to be just observers as one of its most important allies in recent times is engulfed in instability and violence threatening to tear it up (BBC, 2012).

References
Turkey shifts sights eastwards as EU relations stall,’’ Oxford Analytica, April 24, 2012,
http://www.oxan.com/Analysis/DailyBrief/Samples/TurkeyShiftsSightsEastwards.aspx
Zakaria, F. (2007).‘‘Worries About Turkey are Fact-Free Paranoia,’’ Newsweek, May 12,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/05/13/a-quiet-prayer-for-democracy.
html.
Peterson, L. (2009). ‘‘The Pentagon Talks Turkey,’’ The American Prospect 13, No. 16
(September 9), http://prospect.org/article/pentagon-talks-turkey
See ‘‘Istanbul summit tries to increase pressure on Syria,’’ BBC, April 1, 2012, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17576134.
Davutoglu, A., & Derinlik, S. (2001): Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu [Strategic Depth:
Turkey’s International Position] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001).
Schleifer, Y. (2011) From Endearment to Estrangement: Turkey’s Interests and Concerns in Syria October 25, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%20109.pdf
Aras, B., & Koni, H. (2001) Turkish-Syrian Relations Revisited http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/pdfs/23.pdf

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