The DC-10
1. Engineers should have refused to build the DC-10 on the accelerated pace they were under. As it was Douglas’ desire to build a DC-10 cargo doors and the door latch systems just as the DC-8s and DC-9s. It was his responsibility to ensure the conceptual system design was up to the standard destined for it.
2. The engineers should have gone against the corporate entities and built the state-of-the art design, even though it would have led to a result of stiff fines for the engineers in addition to a jail sentence. As the result of making such faltered designs would have resulted to a loss of several of the people’s lives. The violation of the Sherman Antitrust laws would otherwise lead to the high standard of safety for the passengers. The Electrical and Hydraulic subsystems of the DC-10 had only two degrees of back-up redundancy to failed to live up to expectation of a safe mode, while in comparison, the Boeing 747 and the Lockheed L-1011 was composed of a three degrees redundancy back-up a state of the art design. According to the engineers, a third redundancy is far more justifiable as it would increase the air craft’s safety. Its design of placing it below the passengers proved dangerous, in addition to the poor safety of the vital electric and hydraulic lines.
3. The blow out which was as a result of the failure in the cabin floor which was over the cargo compartment leading to a depressurization loading. McDonnell Douglas should have closed the door, as the door was left opened while at a height of 12000 feet, additionally, the over loading on the air craft was supposed to have been looked at before takeoff, no extra loads should have been accepted in the aircraft. The door latches which investigations say were loose should have been tightened before takeoff, additionally a vent which allowed the free flow of air should have been left opened as the plane was over the air flying. An additional force of 120 pounds was too much for the operating handle. With all this considerations there would be no loss of pressure in the cargo compartment hence the flight safety.
Douglas, who is made responsible for his ignorance of the provisions that he had in his possession which was about the installation of the venting provisions in the floor which would have created a safer latch mechanism, should have kept in his mind this provisions that were at his disposals. The steps mentioned should have been made at a speedy pace so as to hinder any recurrence of the same in the near future.
Douglas should have incorporated the left out components of the errors he had left out; this would have ensured that no more of the same errors occurred ever again. Douglas before incorporating the vent doors should have tested the changes he made to ensure the safety of the next passengers to apply the correction she made and not make an assumption of its safety proof. The corrections, which involved incorporating the vent doors in the cargo doors, back fired on him leading to another blow up.
4. Yes I will tell her that the recommendations they are putting across is vital and would result to fatality of the passengers who would end up using the system they planning to design, hence they should look for other measures to use or advance the one proposed, as the safety of several of passengers is at stake even by closer friends. The same answer remains even for a company that is not a close competitor. My credibility as an engineer is also at stake, as my recommendations would also be taken into account and any faulty recommendations that are put forth to the organization will come to haunt my future advancement desires.
References
E. Harris et al (2009). Engineering ethics: concepts and cases. Retrieved on 29th April 2011 from http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=GgHzxP7xPAYC&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=DC-10+SHOULD+ENGINEERS+HAVE+BUILT+IT+douglas&source=bl&ots=PVPdIpPYC4&sig=F8GOXBOEgl27eaRii4hk1R2-Gko&hl=en&ei=Z326Ta2rA47RrQfP0JmPBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBTgK#v=onepage&q&f=false
Fowler T. Wallace (2011). Spacecraft Design Archive. Retrieved on 29th April 2011 from http://www.tsgc.utexas.edu/archive/general/ethics/aacrash.html
H. Fielder John and Birsch Douglas (1992). The DC-10 case: A study in applied ethics, technology, and society. Retrieved on 29th April 2011 from http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=gBHGmwmMj30C&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=DC-10+SHOULD+ENGINEERS+HAVE+BUILT+IT&source=bl&ots=v2pS1brXUt&sig=6AUWZVzsRVXaSPXgGsCP8XhQy8A&hl=en&ei=YGu6TdqlEs6mrAfDt-WIBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=door%20blow&f=false
Perrow Charles (1984). Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies, with a new afterword. Retrieved on 29th April 2011 from http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=VC5hYoMw4N0C&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=DC-10+SHOULD+ENGINEERS+HAVE+BUILT+IT+douglas&source=bl&ots=MC8kaN91g8&sig=hUMoWlv5_4meYj8VP87f_HuULfc&hl=en&ei=Z326Ta2rA47RrQfP0JmPBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CD4Q6AEwBjgK#v=onepage&q&f=false
