Gravatt v. Columbia University, 845 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1988)
Facts of the case
In the case of Gravatt v. Columbia University (1988), the issue was whether a plaintiff seeking to dismiss his complaint without prejudice must be given a chance to withdraw his motion. The main issue was a concern especially in the event where the court decides that if such a motion is afforded; there will be a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff had filed an initial complaint where he had charged Colombian university with libel and discrimination. The plaintiff also alleged diversity jurisdiction. In his claim, Gravatt alleged that he was denied a chance to attain an advanced degree in mathematical statistics since only foreign students were allowed by the university to sit for the qualifying examinations and this amounted to discrimination. The plaintiff further claimed that the university misrepresented his academic qualifications that he had obtained from Colombian university, and this amounted to libel (Leagle, 2013).
Issues
Gravatt, the plaintiff, encountered some obstacles in his attempt to prepare the New York case for trial. Consequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the case from New York to the Illinois, but the motion was not granted. The plaintiff invoked voluntarily the dismissal without prejudice provided for under Rule 41(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the judge adopted a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice made by the magistrate.
Disposition
The appeal court held that Rule 41(a) (2) does not allow a judge to convert dismissal without prejudice to dismissal with prejudice. The rule however, authorizes the court to dismiss the action on such conditions and terms it deems fit. The court further noted that before a judge convert a dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice; the plaintiff should be given a chance to withdraw a motion for dismissal without prejudice. The appeal court concluded that where the motion is withdrawn or denied, the plaintiff must immediately prepare the case for trial otherwise involuntary dismissal would be appropriate for failure to prosecute (Gravatt v. Columbia University, 1988).
My opinion
I do agree with the decision of the appellant court that the judge erred by converting a dismissal without prejudice to one with prejudice because Rule 41(a) (2) does not give a judge such discretion.
Marlow v. Winston and Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, *306 (7th Cir. 1994)
Facts of the case
In this case, Marlow, the plaintiff had been granted a motion for voluntary in part of non-suit. However, it was converted into a dismissal with prejudice without giving the plaintiff a chance to elect between proceeding to trial or accepting the dismissal (Leagle, 2013). National Futures Association (NFA) issued administrative complaints against Marlow a commodity trader indicating that Marlow and Provest, Inc had distributed deceptive as well as misleading promotional information to potential customers of the commodity. NFA demanded that Marlow must submit all promotional information meant for public consumption to NFA offices after Marlow had distributed such promotional literature to NFA’s customers. After a while, NFA changed the directives and ordered Marlow to submit promotional information fourteen days before distribution of such information. NFA later forbade Marlow from soliciting new accounts or using promotional literature mistakenly believing that there was a violation of directives issued in September 1988 on the part of Marlow. Consequently, Provest, Inc. became bankrupt and Marlow commenced a legal action against the defendants for giving negligent advice to NFA that ultimately led to his insolvency and bankruptcy of Provest (Leagle, 2013).
Issues
The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss his complaint voluntarily without prejudice concerned that under the Illinois law it was legally insufficient to present his one-count complaint. The district judge, however, dismissed the case with prejudice. Court did not give Marlow an opportunity to elect between going to trial and taking such dismissal with prejudice (Leagle, 2013).
Disposition
The appellant court concluded that the district judge overstepped her discretion by dismissing the complaints of Marlow with prejudice in light of Rule 41(a) (2). The appellant court reversed and remanded the order of dismissal by the district court. (Leagle, 2013).
My opinion
I agree with the decision of the court to reverse and remand the order of the district court because Marlow was not granted a chance to elect between going to trial and taking such dismissal with prejudice. The denial of such an opportunity negates the provisions of Rule 41(a) (2).
References
Leagle T. (2013). Gravatt. v. Columbia University (1988), [1988] 845 F.2d 54. Retrieved from http://www.leagle.com/decision/1988899845F2d54_1887
Leagle T. (2013). Marlow. v. Winston and Strawn (1994), [1994]19 F.3d 300,306. Retrieved from http://www.leagle.com/decision/199431919F3d300_1272
