- I strongly disagree with the statement. Although the two clauses were meant to create a substantial relationship between religion and the government, and at the same time serve a common purpose, tension between the two clauses has been conspicuously noted. Particularly, the two provisions create issues that actually make individuals to become unable to practice their religious practices as well the state becomes unable to apply[1] Free Exercise rights adequately Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) .
Evidently, the Free Exercise Clause had been misinterpreted thereby increasing tension between the state and different religious groups. For instance, the Smith Vs. Employment Division of Oregon case in 1990 whereby the decision of the court provoked the attempt of passing of Act that would allow for freedom of religion. Notably the Act of religion freedom proposed by the members of congress failed to materialize because from the corridors of justice, the members of the congress did not have to induce the state to accommodate religious practices and beliefs that seemed burdensome to the state. It is also evident that the free exercise clause only protects religious beliefs as opposed to religious practices. It is for this reason that Religion Establishment was necessary
The two clauses have denied individuals their rights since their provisions are conflicting. This is because the clauses are never in harmony. They accommodate different interpretations when the free exercise clause means the Religion establishment clause highlights different concerns. It is for this reason that the two clauses are always creating tension. As an example, the 2004 case between Davey and Locke which involved a scholarship awarded through Washington State to gifted students. Conspicuously, the state scholarship program allowed gifted students to take any major course with an exception of devotional theology degree. Davey, the gifted student who had won the scholarship wanted to pursue a program in theology at a religious collage that is not owned by the government. Davey was however denied a chance to take his dream program since the course is exempted as far as the utilization of the tax payers’ money is concerned He therefore sued the state for violating his provided rights of free exercise.
Evidently, both the Religion establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause have almost similar provisions but these provisions are never in harmony. The Free exercise clause allows for academic pursuit through the tax payers money[2]. On the other hand the religion establishment clause allows for the exclusion of studies in devotional theories which in itself is an academic pursuit just like any other. However, Davey felt that his free exercise rights had been violated despite the provisions of the Religion establishment. As results these two clauses always create tensions, misunderstanding and disharmony.
It is evidently true that the two clauses denies people equal rights as far as aspects of life are concerned and that is why they are never in harmony. Providing and failing to provide rights through one clause violate the other and vice versa. For instance, if the government provides a chaplain to its military troops who are in another country, a violation of Religion Establishment clause may be considered. On other hand if the state fails to provide the troops with a chaplain, it is liable for violation of the troop’s rights of Free Exercise. It as a result becomes hard for the two clauses to work together with less tension
- First amendment
The Court has over time used standards to adjudicate freedom of expression in order to address the question of the first amendment which seeks to guarantee freedom of expression. As the Courts tries to ensure that freedom of expression is established, they have regulated the interpretation of the law especially by states. Regarding the freedom of speech, the first time that the Court ruled on constitutionality was at the start of the twentieth century (Parker, 2003). This was done due to the sedition Acts which expired at the start of the nineteenth century.
The 1917 Espionage Act judged several activities including mutiny and disloyalty to be unconstitutional. In an important case Schenck v United States, Schenck was found guilty according to the Espionage Act because of opposition to the draft which was being conducted during the WW1 (Parker, 2003). Advocacy for communism during the following years was treated as threat to American safety and thus those who spoke contrary to the government were found guilty. According to Parker (2003), the Smith Act followed in 1940 to limit the advocacy on government attacks.
The standard that the Court used was based on the level of danger presented by any act that was deemed evil. The freedom of expression could therefore be violated if it became necessary to do so in order to avoid posing danger to others (Parker, 2003). In 1957 though, the Court changed their standard to explain danger as action oriented and not merely the expression of ideas (Parker, 2003). During the Vietnam War, the courts continued to give ground on freedom of expression by restricting state power to violate right of expression unless where the expression constituted incitement.
In 1969, in a case Brandenburg V Ohio, the Court did away with the standard of ‘clear and present danger’ which had prevailed during the twentieth century but which had been lessened in power (Parker, 2003). Beginning the 1970’s there was more expression of ideas and speech without fear of repercussions as the Courts supported the right to the first amendment Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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The courts have not adhered to a single standard because the interpretation of the law has been continuous. As the United States applied the law, challenges to the constitution have come up and it is only with application that the constitution can be fully understood. While in some instances the actions in the cases presented what was perceived as danger, in other circumstances, the expression was deemed necessary in order to facilitate interchange of ideas[3]. The Court was also willing to restrict the freedom of expression during certain times and not others because of the implications that would result from citizens exercising their rights.
During wars, there were more restrictions. This safeguarded the country from what was perceived as dangerous including people abandoning the war, to creating sympathy for communism which the US government was against. As the war ended, there was less restriction as the expressions did not seem to pose as much danger.
The standards that have been used by the court are satisfactory because the country should be protected. As much as the constitution is clear, there should be room for interpretation of the law.
Different circumstances in the country require the Courts to interpret the best way in which citizens and the country can be protected. As a result, the best is achieved by mitigating what personal freedoms are untouchable and which can be suspended for the common good. The standards however should be more precise and aligned against the constitution. The Courts should then have less freedom in interpreting the standards if they are made more precise. This will ensure that freedom of expression and speech in the first amendment is protected and not prone to abuse and constant interpretation or changes.
3.
The first amendment prohibits the congress from making laws that abridged the freedom of the press .The major focus is to build a fourth institution independent from government to check the executive, legislature and the judiciary. These amendments focus on protecting the right to independence of religion and expression from the interferences by the state or government interference. The framer intent entailed the possibility of having a system that will be able to embrace and respect the rights of the people. The sovereignty to express the opinion that one has entails the rights to freedom press, speech, assembly and to appeal to the government for a remedy of complaint, and the oblique rights of association and belief. The second amendment also prohibited the congress from making such laws.
The freedom to conceal sources of information has been one of the privileges the press enjoy. Responsible journalists are expected to protect whistleblowers. This would help while revealing corrupt deals, and other misuse of office by government officials. This freedom has however been criticized when they hide reputation damaging sources, participants in crime as in the case of Judith miller where she refused to disclose the source of the information on her information something that has to be taken into serious consideration.
The extent of the intensity of the courts’ willingness on the restriction of the First Amendment rights of the media especially the radio, TV and the print journalism positions their basis on a number of factors. The courts are facilitated by the objectives that the given media is yearning to achieve[4]. This portrays a great magnitude as the success of the specific media group relies on it. The court experiences a number of challenges in striving for the achievement of this target Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The court is viewed as the point source of the rights by the media; similarly the government depends on the courts for the issuing of the rules to be followed and the strategies on its behalf.
Beginning with the first amendment rights of radio, the court exposes a greater level of reluctance in its restriction. This is geared at the safety of the world’s community in the dependence of the radio. Initially the law controlled the electronic media in and required the radios prominence and usage to be manned solely by given institutions with the government inclusive. But the amendment of the right of ownership has observed significance on the release of the rigid restrictions. However the courts are prompted to enforce more restrictions on the rights as others tend to abuse them.
The courts are willing in the restriction of the amendment rights in Television sector and the written media. The courts demand the government’s intervention on the programs offered by the Television broadcast so as to limit an increase of non ethical practices.
Reference
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
Parker, R. (ed.). Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on
Landmark Supreme Court Decisions. YALE L.J. (2003).
[1] Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
[2] Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
[3] Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
[4] Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
