The Battle of the Manassas
This was the first major war in the American history of civil war which took place near the Manassas at a railway junction. It was also known as the battle of Bull Run, a name derived from the flowing stream within the venue of the war, it was fought in July 21, 1861(Wilkes 3). Brigadier Irvin McDowell commanded the federal forces which had four divisions each with twelve thousand men; in addition he also had a division of New Jersey regiments as stand- by also known as the Runyan’s division. The divisions were commanded by Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, (Runyan) and also Miles. Confederates command structure was not so structured; it had two armies without clear structure divisions and had thirteen sovereign brigades under Bonham, Longstreet, Jones, Cocke, Early, Kershaw, Evans, Jackson, Bartow, Bee, Smith, Ewell, and Stuart’s Calvary Brigade. Brigadier General Pierre G.T. Beauregard was in charge of the confederate army of Potomac while the army of Shenandoah was under the command of Brigadier Joseph E. Johnston. The two forces were just as strong as McDowell’s.
Both the forces had planned to begin their gruelling attack on the other side with feint attack on the enemy’s right flank combined with a massed one on the left flank. If this strategy was to be followed o the later and executed effectively by both armies they would just have revolved round each other and found themselves in each other’s back side.(Hennessey 105) They would have been able to march undeterred to Washington or Richmond. Interestingly the commander who was not very successful in starting this movement was the winner. McDowell’s secret was to use Tyler’s division divisionary attack to the Stone Bridge.
At Blackburn, Davies’ brigade did the same and Heintzelman’s and Hunter’s divisions would cross Bull Run. During the first days of the war the north under the command of Brigadier General Irvin McDowell marched in the opposition of the army of the confederate. McDowell’s troupes were inexperienced the whole reason as to why his surprise attack against the confederate left was not properly executed. The intended attack by the confederates from left flank was initially faced by shortcomings. Brigadier Joseph E Johnston who was the commander of the confederate brought in reinforcement by train from Shenandoah Valley. The Virginian troupes under Colonel Thomas J Jackson from Virginia military institute remained adamant which earned him the name Stonewall. This led to a very strong counterattack by the confederates, when the union army started to withdraw due to pressure many were overcame by fear as they withdrew to Washington D.C. all the sides were awakened by the violence and the causalities of the battle. At this point it became clear that the war was not just about to end, and that it would involve a lot of blood shedding than they had thought.
The fact that Brigadier McDowell was a political appointee of President Abraham Lincoln made him to face a lot of political interference by politicians who had vested interests. The citizens were also impatient because they expected a quick victory against the confederate troupes in northern Virginia; this pressure drove him to the edge, he was however bothered by the inexperience of his army. McDowell was constantly reassured by the president that they were novice in the war just as the confederate were. McDowell lobbied intensively and on July 16, 1861 (Smith 10) he left Washington with a very large army ever in North America. It consisted of about 35,000 men of which 28,452 were effectives (Smith 7). He planned to move to the west with his troupes in three columns, and attack the confederate in a diversion form at Bull Run With two columns. The third column was to cut the railroad to Richmond by moving around the confederates’ right flank to the south, this was also intended to scare the rear rebel army. He believed that through this ploy the confederates would be forced to withdraw from Manassas to the Rappahannock River which was the next line of defence in Virginia; this would reduce the pressure on the capital.
Manassas junction was the base of the confederate army of the Potomac; it was located 40km from the capital of the United States (Smith 31). Major Robert Peterson engaged Johnson’s army of Shenandoah to block them from reinforcing Beauregard while McDowell was to attack the confederate army of the Potomac which was under Beauregard. The union army was given a rest in Centreville after two days of matching in the heat. Consequently, McDowell reduced the size of his army to 30,000 and released Brigadier Theodore with his 5,000 troops for the protection of the army’s far end. During that period McDowell looked for a way of outdoing Beauregard who drew his lines on Bull Run. Brigadier Daniel Tyler was sent by the union commander on July 18, to deliver the confederate right (southeast) flank. Tyler became involved in the war at Blackburn’s Ford against Bull Run but did not achieve much. McDowell attacked the confederate left flank instead. His plan was to attack with Brigadier Tyler’s division at the Stone Bridge and deploy the divisions of Brigadier David Hunter and Samuel P. Over Sudley Springs Ford. This division was then to march to the confederate back and the Tyler’s division was to attack the enemies of Blackburn’s Ford to block them from spoiling the main attack. Shenandoah was to be taken care of by Patterson so that the reinforcements could not access the area.
McDonald had a good plan but it had some loops: it required uniform and coordinated movement of troops, it required skills that they did not have, and it banked on Peterson’s plans which did not take place. McDowell delayed for a very long time that Johnston’s valley boarded the trains at Piedmont station and rushed to Manassas junction and reinforced Beauregard’s troops. Johnson’s troops stroke with his army on July 20(Locke 32) most of his troops were deployed to Blackburn Ford while Beauregard plan was to stage an attack from the North towards Centreville, and the plan was approved by Johnston who was the chief commander.
McDowell sent 12,000 men both from the Hunters and Heintzelman to Centreville on July 21; they marched to the southwest on the Warrenton Turnpike and then turned towards the North western and headed to Sudley Springs. The 8,000 troops of Tyler division marched towards the Stone Bridge. The inexperienced units were hampered by logistical problems. The division headed by Tyler closed off the front side of the most important flanking column. The troops that trailed found the route to Sudley Springs impassable, therefore, they waited until 9:30 am, and it was until 6:00 am that Tyler’s troops reached Stone Bridge (McPherson 26). Artilleries were fired by Richardson’s troops towards Mitchell’s Ford the confederate right at 5:00 am which hit Beauregard’s headquarters, this awakened him to the fact that his attack plan had been foreseen. He gave orders for the north towards Centreville; however lack of well planned orders and lack of proper communication led to poor execution of their intention. Brigadier Ewell was supposed to order the attack at Union Mills Ford but he was instructed to wait in for orders in the shortest time possible, they were supposed to attack together with Brigadier Jones but he found himself moving ahead alone.
Another which was supposed to be there was from Holmes but unfortunately he did not receive any orders. This happened against 20,000, union soldiers at the confederate left were Colonel Evans with a brigade of 1,100 troops. (Weigley 63) Evans suspected that the attacks from the Union Brigade of Brigadier Robert were feints. He had prior information about the main Union flanking movement from Alexander. Alexander furnished him with information to watch out. Evans hurriedly deployed some of his men from Stone Bridge to Mathew Hill. Brigadier Bee and Colonel Hunters sent troops to reinforce Evans in order to cross Young’s Branch. Tyler’s brigade led by Colonel William passed on to the uncovered ford and hit the confederate defenders flank to the right. This brought down the confederate line disorienting them to retreat to Henry House Hill. The remaining troops of Evan’s, Bee’s and Bartows’s got cover from captain John Imboden, they countered the Union advance as the confederates tried to reorganize themselves on Henry House Hill. They bumped into generals Beauregard and Johnson who had arrived from Johnston headquarters. It was by sheer luck for the confederates that McDowell did not use his advantage to conquer immediately; he bombarded the hill with the batteries. Virginia brigade rose in support of the confederates under Colonel Thomas Jackson and Colonel Wade Hampton.
Five regiments were sent by Jackson on the backwards slope of the hill and they were guarded from direct fire and thirteen guns were assembled for the defensive line. The guns were sent to the crest hill where their recoil moved them down the backward slope where they could be reloaded. Rickets and Griffin received orders from McDowell to move away from Dogan’s Ridge to the hill for support.
There were eleven guns involved in fierce artillery against 13 by Jackson. (Hennessy 78) The confederate’s artillery was advantageous. The rifled pieces on the Union side were ineffective weapons from a close range. The artillery exchange left Judith Carter Henry injured and as a result she was unable to move from her bedroom in the Henry House, this made Ricketts to assume that it was coming from the Henry House, consequently he turned his Guns on the house. This resulted into so many injuries on Judith carter from which she eventually died. This led to controversial invocations by Bee and Jackson as Bee. Bee claimed that Jackson was just standing like a stone wall, just immediately after he had made the statement he was seriously wounded. It was alleged by major Burnett who was chief of staff to General Johnson that Bee was upset with Jackson for not coming to their rescue when they under extreme pressure. Two guns were moved by commander Griffin to the south end of his territory.
The 33rd Virginia men of Jackson’s brigade in blue uniforms caused confusion to Griffins commander as they mistaken it for union troops and as a result Griffin did not fire at them. The 33rd Virginia men levelled muskets and fired. At this point in time the union lost unity as the guns were wiped out. Cavalry attacks on the infantry flanks that were supporting the battery killed so many gunners and dispersed the infantry. The afternoon loss of cohesion by the northern army aggravated their predicaments as they fought in a disconnected way. Elated by this breakthrough Jackson commanded two regiments to charge Ricketts guns and they were also captured. The deployment of an extra federal infantry led to the exchange guns. McDowell was unable to get two reserve brigades into the duel.
Contrary Johnston and Beauregard brought up all the units including the only remaining brigade from the valley. At around 4.00pm the troops alighted from the train and marched straight into the battle field, this equalised the number of the men in the battle area. Each side engaged approximately 18,000 men, their was the advantage of fresh troops as most of the union had spent the better part of the fourteen hours marching or fighting coupled with inadequate water and food plus a hot sultry day. The sight of confederate charging forward caused the northern soldiers to wonder loudly where their reserves were. Beauregard took advantage of this and ordered an attack to counter all along the line. Just at the time the confederates were charging, the air was rented by a strange eerie scream. This scream was referred to as the rebel yell.
This time the union troops heard for the first time the sound of the Rebel yell. it is on this same day that the union troops were pushed away from the Henry House Hill by two regiments led by colonel Cocke’s brigade. Colonel Oliver O Howard with his brigade had invaded the western side of Chinn Ridge.
At around the same time the confederates brought in two brigades from Shenandoah Valley. The Howard’s troop was defeated by the Smith’s brigade. Beauregard’s line charged forward while McDowell’s retreated. The retreat was not well managed by the union officers as their wagon was overturned by artillery fire. This caused fear in McDowell’s as the troop scampered to Centerville abandoning their weapons. Colonel Dixon under the command of McDowell tried to safeguard the rear part in vain. This is because they were far from Washington. This led to the imprisonment of the union troops.
At the time the union army was driven back amidst a lot of confusion the roads had been jammed by panicked civilians who were trying to escape, they had come to enjoy themselves as they watched the battle; they thought that they could win the war within the shortest time. Among this civilians were congressmen who tried in vain to stop worn out soldiers who were now miles away from the battlefield. The soldiers had no intention of stopping except at Potomac rear end. The congress employed many tricks among them insults and threats to convince to stop and fight back but all that was in vain. They had become hopeless and this they communicated to all the people both in front and the rear. The weather was so unfavourable, they were exhausted, their mouths became gape and their lips were black and had been blackened by the cartridges powder they had bitten in the battle. This was such a ghastly wretch never experienced before.
The case on the Bull Run side was totally different as jubilant rebels were celebrating their victory and held Union prisoners hostage. The nature of Jefferson Davis did not allow him to sit still in Richmond as the battle unfolded miles away; he had turned up just at the victory moment. Davis’ elation caused him to declare vigorous pursuit of the conquered enemy. The confederate units had disappeared beyond any shadow of doubt away from Bull Run but Johnston and Beauregard still believed that no full scale pursuit was possible. Johnston was quoted as follows “our Army was more disorganised by victory than that of the United States by defeat”. (McPherson 34).
This war saw 367 confederates and 460 unionists killed, there were 1,582 confederates and 1,124 missing.13 confederates and 1,312 unionists were reportedly missing (Ropes 127). From this it is very clear that although the confederates won the war they also had a very high number of causalities, they had head the head start of fresh soldiers who were not very exhausted as opposed to the unions who had a myriad of problems among the lack of adequate food and water. The unions had also been exposed to harsh weather conditions.
References
Hennessey, John. Return to Bull Run: the Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas’s: University of Oklahoma 1999, p78-105.
McPherson, James. Battle cry of Freedom: The Civil war era. USA, Oxford University1988, p26-35.
Ropes Codman. The Army under Pope. New York: Digital Reproduction 2001, p 108-127
Smith, Woodson. Generals J.E Johnston and G.T Beauregard at The Battle of Manassas July 1861, USA: BiblioBazaar, LLC 1995, p7-61.
Telfer, William. A Reminiscence of the First Battle of Manassas: A camp-fire story of the Seventy-first Regiment N.G.S.N.Y. UK. Tefler 1864, p46
Weigley, Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.New York: Indiana University 1977, p13-63.
